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Recently, some researchers have developed
stylized theoretical models to defend this con-
ventional wisdom, while others have begun to
question it. Two themes, which do not neces-
sarily depend upon one another, have emerged
to support the view that a currency monopoly
is economically efficient. One theme is that
currency provision is a natural monopoly.3
This natural monopoly arises in part because
there are increasing returns to scale that result
from the cross-sectional independence of
demands for individual redemptions of cur-
rency.4 Increasing returns to scale could also
arise because fixed costs are high—sophisti-
cated technology for soil measurement and
Introduction
It is the conventional wisdom that a govern-
ment monopoly in the provision of currency is
an appropriate public policy. In fact, although
Congress required the Federal Reserve to
establish a system of fees for its payment
services (check clearing and collection, wire
transfers, automated clearinghouse transfers,
and securities safekeeping) to encourage com-
petition and to promote payment system effi-
ciency, it did not require any charges for cash
services of a “governmental nature,” such as
the disbursement and receipt of new or fit coin
and currency.1 Accordingly, provisions in the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 require a schedule
of fees only for cash services such as coin
wrapping and transportation. Congress felt that
it could safely open such services to competition
from the private sector because the provision
of these services is not essential to the Federal
Reserve in its pursuit of its primary responsibility
“to provide the nation with currency and coin
of high quality” nor with the Federal Reserve’s
ability to “expand or contract the amount of
currency and coin in response to the public’s
demand.”2
  1 During the course of congressional consideration of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Senator Proxmire indicated that the
Federal Reserve would not be required to charge for these services.
(Remarks of Senator William Proxmire, Congressional Record (daily 
edition), March 27, 1980, p. S 3168.)
  2 See U.S. Congress (1980, S3168, March 27).
  3 See King (1983, pp. 132–33).
  4 Miller and Orr (1966) provide a cash-management model that
possesses this increasing-returns-to-scale property.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2001 Q43
counterfeit note detection is needed to process
currency, and transporting currency is expen-
sive. The second theme focuses on the imprac-
ticality of interest-bearing currency. It is argued
that the computation, information, and transac-
tion costs of collecting interest on currency
can easily exceed the value of the interest that
might be collected, particularly for low-denomi-
nation notes.5 In this environment, it is argued
that competitive currency providers would have
an incentive to take actions that increase the
“quality” of currency (for example, by making
expenditures that would reduce counterfeiting
or improve the fitness of notes). To the extent
that such in-kind benefits are valued by con-
sumers at less than their cost of production,
seigniorage (the difference between the nomi-
nal interest rate and the cost of production)
would be wastefully dissipated.6
The view that a competitive currency market
would be more efficient than a monopoly
provider is based on the argument that compet-
itive providers would choose to offer higher-
quality currency services—at a higher cost—
only when the additional cost is justified by the
additional value of output.7 Implicitly, it is
assumed that competitive firms are not legally
restricted from freely employing whatever tech-
nology is most cost efficient.8 That is, the
monopolist and the competitive firm have
identical costs for providing a given quantity
and quality of currency services. Under such
circumstances, nonprice competition improves
social efficiency because a monopolist has no
incentive to provide an appropriate level of
currency services with the valued quality
enhancements. 
It is unlikely, however, that a monopolist
and a competitive firm would have identical
costs for providing a given quality and quantity
of currency services. This is because monopo-
lists tend to pursue the objective of cost mini-
mization less effectively than do competitive
firms, being more likely to produce at an
inefficient level of output (scale inefficiency) or
to produce a given level of output with more
resources than are required (cost inefficiency).
Thus, competition among providers of currency
services may be beneficial because such
providers may be induced to be more scale and
cost efficient than a monopoly provider.
Although an empirical understanding of
currency cost considerations would enlighten
the foregoing discussion, there is a dearth of
research on such topics. First, only two studies
have analyzed the scale economies for currency
provision, Zimmerman (1981) and Dotsey
(1991). Neither of those studies is likely to
shed light on potential scale economies today,
however, because they were based on data
from periods (1977 and 1988–90, respectively)
when the Federal Reserve used relatively
unsophisticated technologies to determine the
fitness level of notes, detect counterfeits, and
destroy unfit notes. New currency processing
technologies may have increased potential
scale economies. Second, because it is a com-
plex task to estimate the costs of improving
currency quality, such studies have been
performed even more sporadically. Currency-
quality cost estimates require quality measure-
ments (such as soil-detection standards) and
calculations that measure changes in currency
handling costs that might arise from changes to
these qualities. These calculations are compli-
cated even more because handling costs also
depend on a number of other intertwined
factors. For example, if currency quality is
improved (by improving the quality of existing
notes or adding additional anticounterfeiting
features, for example), handling costs may rise
due to factors such as a higher destruction rate
for unfit currency, additional printing costs for
the new notes, a shorter life span for these
notes, and possibly the need to process addi-
tional volume.9 Finally, there are no studies
that estimate the cost efficiency of Federal
Reserve currency operations. For Federal
Reserve payment services that do compete
with private sector providers, cost-efficiency
estimates are available (Bauer and Hancock
  5 See Fama (1981, 1983), White (1987), and Sumner (1993).
  6 See, for example, Fama (1983) and Sumner (1993, 2000).
  7 See White and Boudreaux (2000, p. 152).
  8 Lacker (1996) has discussed the case in which competitive
private issuers have an industry cost curve everywhere higher than that of
a monopoly issuer because of legal restrictions on the competitors’
technology choice.
  9 Although the following example moves currency quality in the
opposite direction, in 1991 the Federal Reserve System estimated that
it would cost about $1.2 million per year (in 1990 dollars) if it lowered
the minimum quality threshold for recirculated notes by one step on a
16-step measurement scale, but such costs would be offset by lower
annual printing costs of about $7.6 million per year, which would be
absorbed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Over a 10-year period,
the discounted net present value of savings from a one-step decrease in
the minimum quality threshold for U.S. currency was estimated to be
$82.9 million. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1991, pp. 1–14).
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[1993], Bauer and Ferrier [1996]). Such estimates
are comparable to those for private-sector
financial institutions reported elsewhere (such
as Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey [1993] and
Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey [1993]).
This paper explores the Federal Reserve’s
cost of providing currency services, using
quarterly data from 1991 to 1996. Whereas
previous studies (Zimmerman [1981] and Dotsey
[1991]) were concerned only with whether a
Federal Reserve currency processing and han-
dling facility was producing an efficient level
of output (scale efficiency), this study also
considers cost inefficiency (deviations from the
cost frontier), which is sometimes interpreted
as X-inefficiency. Cost inefficiency occurs when
actual costs are higher than the minimum
possible for a given level of output, either
because more of each input is employed than
is required by the production process or
because inputs are employed in suboptimal
proportions. 
We construct and compare several different
models of currency operations to test the
robustness of our results. A unique aspect of
this study is that we have detailed information
about the equipment that was used at each
facility. This information included the number
of processing machines of each type, an imple-
mentation schedule for new equipment instal-
lations, and usage statistics that indicated the
amount of “downtime” each piece of equip-
ment experienced at each facility. These data
allow us to account in our cost-function speci-
fications for the unavoidable transition costs
associated with the introduction of a new
technology. Such adjustment costs could sig-
nificantly affect the scale and cost efficiency
of each facility as it deployed the new tech-
nology.10 In addition, because the cost functions
we estimate depend not only on costs associ-
ated with keeping fit currency in circulation
but also on the costs associated with destroying
unfit currency, the parameter estimates could
possibly be used to forecast changes in pro-
cessing costs associated with changing the
quality of currency in circulation.11
The next section describes the currency
operations of the Federal Reserve System.
Section II discusses the cost-function specifi-
cations we use and the econometric techniques
we employ to estimate the cost frontier and
facility-level returns to scale and cost efficien-
cies. Section III describes the data for output
and input quantities as well as input prices.
Section IV presents our estimates of returns
to scale, marginal costs of different outputs,
and facility-level cost efficiencies for
Federal Reserve currency processing and
handling facilities. Section V concludes and
discusses some policy implications of our
empirical findings. 
I. Background
The Federal Reserve’s involvement in the
provision of paper currency dates back to its
founding in 1913. The provisions of the Federal
Reserve Act relating to currency were designed
to provide for an “elastic currency” that could
expand and contract as the public’s demand
for cash increased and decreased.12 Prior to
that time, the kinds of currency in circulation
had proved incapable of meeting the needs for
additional amounts that developed from time
to time on a seasonal and cyclical basis as well
as in periods of financial crisis.
The first Federal Reserve notes were issued
in late 1914. By statute, these notes were
obligations of the United States, a first lien on
the assets of the issuing Federal Reserve Bank,
backed 100 percent by discounted commercial
notes and bills and a 40 percent gold reserve.13
These notes were redeemable in gold or
lawful money. 
In 1920, the Appropriations Act authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer to the
Federal Reserve Banks and branches various
functions that were performed in connection
with the issue, exchange, and replacement of
U.S. paper currency and coins and the receipt
for redemption of national bank notes and
Federal Reserve Bank notes.14 This assumption
of duties by the Federal Reserve Banks and
branches led to an improvement in the overall
quality of U.S. currency and an improvement
with respect to the supply of notes of desired
denominations.15
  10 See Hancock, Humphrey, and Wilcox (1999).
  11 As noted above, such cost estimates would play a role in
estimating the social costs that would be incurred to improve currency
quality.
  12 See Booth (1989).
  13 In 1934, the Gold Reserve Act stopped redemption of currency
for gold. In 1968, the requirement of gold reserves against Federal
Reserve notes was eliminated. Also in 1968, the redemption of currency
for silver was discontinued.
  14 See U.S. Treasury Department, Circular No. 55.
  15 These improvements were noted in the 1921 Annual Report of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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In 1980, Congress again expanded the role
of Federal Reserve Banks with respect to the
distribution of currency and coin. The Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (MCA) authorized Federal
Reserve Banks and branches to distribute
available supplies of coin and currency to
depository institutions, including not only
member and nonmember banks, but also savings
banks, savings and loan associations, and credit
unions. This change dramatically increased the
number of end points served by the Reserve
Banks. In addition, the MCA required that
transportation of coin and currency as well as
coin-wrapping services be provided according
to a schedule of fees established by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The growing number of institutions with
access to Federal Reserve cash services, in
conjunction with the limited facilities of
Reserve Banks, led to the adoption of “uniform
cash service standards” in 1984. These standards
defined normal service to each depository
institution as once per week; indicated that
Reserve Banks would accept deposits of
reusable currency and coin when a depository
institution accumulates a surplus that cannot be
reasonably stored or disposed of by direct
exchange with other depository institutions;
and minimized or eliminated, where practi-
cable, “cross-shipments” (the deposit of excess
fit currency and reorder of the same denomi-
nation within five business days).16
Today, Federal Reserve Banks and branches
have significant currency and coin responsibili-
ties. Most Federal Reserve Banks and branches
maintain facilities for currency processing,
handling, and distribution. These facilities are
specially constructed, high-security areas that
receive new notes from the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing and used notes from depository
institutions with excess currency holdings.
Used notes are deposited in the form of straps
(bundles of one hundred notes) and blocks
(bundles of ten straps). Straps and blocks are
manually counted in the receiving area,
catalogued, and stored in a vault for a short
period of time, generally between 10 and 15
days, although deposits of $1 notes often
exceed 30 days. 
Used notes are counted and verified as
genuine on high-speed currency sorters. This
equipment is fairly sophisticated and performs
many tasks. First, the packaging material on
each strap is removed. Second, sensors deter-
mine which notes are fit for circulation. A note
may be deemed unfit because of its physical
condition: It may be torn or have holes in it,
be too soiled, or no longer have a sufficiently
crisp texture. Unfit notes are destroyed using
on-line shredders that are attached to the high-
speed equipment. Fit notes are repackaged by
the sorter into straps and blocks for workers to
return to the vault. Third, counterfeit notes or
those that cannot be read by the high-speed
equipment are sent to workers who manually
examine each note and pass it through a low-
speed machine that, along with the high-speed
machines, reconciles the account of the
depositing depository institution.
Over the last 20 years, the Federal Reserve
has adopted increasingly sophisticated
machines that are better able to determine the
fitness level of notes and detect counterfeits.
The first generation of high-speed currency
sorters, Currency Verification, Counting, and
Sorting (CVCS) machines, were installed during
the 1980s. These machines were gradually
replaced by a second generation of high-speed
currency sorters, Banknote Processing System
(BPS) 3000 machines, which were installed
during the 1990s. This second generation 
of machines was subsequently upgraded with
new software and hardware to improve 
performance.
Currency, whether fit or new, enters circu-
lation when withdrawn by a depository
institution. Depository institutions cannot
specifically request new currency from the
Federal Reserve. Rather, orders are filled with
the first available currency from the vault.
Federal Reserve offices handle a considerable
amount of currency each year (table 1). In
1999, for example, more than 7 billion notes
were destroyed and more than 9.5 billion new
notes were put into circulation.
II. Estimation
Techniques
A variety of econometric techniques have been
developed for estimating cost frontiers. Such
techniques employ a specific flexible functional
form for the cost function, and each one
imposes some additional assumptions about
the statistical properties of the inefficiency
terms. In this paper, we use two different
  16 These standards have since been modified. See the Federal
Register notice dated April 30, 1996, for a detailed discussion of the
uniform cash access policies, which became effective May 1,1998.
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functional forms for the cost function. This
allows us to examine the robustness of our
results to different assumptions with respect
to the functional form of the cost function. In
addition, we use two different frontier estima-
tion techniques to ascertain how robust our
facility-level efficiency rankings are to alterna-
tive assumptions about the statistical properties
of the inefficiency terms. 
The first functional form for the cost function
we consider is the translog,
J 1
JJ
(1)  lnCit=β0+ βj lnyjit+ _     βjk lnyjit lnykit
j=1 2 j=1k=1
L J L




+_     lm lnwlit lnwmit+ χnlnenit 2 l=1m=1 n=1
1996 4
+   t Dt +  ηq Qq
t=1992 q=1
3
+   j Tjit +uit + vit,
j=1
where i and t indicate that an observation is for
facility i at time t, y is a vector of output
quantities, w is a vector of input prices, and e
is a vector of N environmental variables (these
are described in more detail later). D is a set of
indicator variables that equals one in a particu-
lar year and zero otherwise and is meant
to allow for technical change. Q is a set of
indicator variables that equals one in a particu-
lar quarter and zero otherwise and is meant to
allow for seasonal effects. The Tit terms allow
for adjustment costs associated with the instal-
lation of second-generation equipment (BPS
3000 machines). Since such costs were not
necessarily linear over time, we define three
adjustment-cost variables, T 1it, T2it, and T3it.
The first two, T 1it (T2it), are indicator variables
that equal one in the first (second) quarter that
a machine was installed, and zero otherwise.
The third, T3it, is a time-trend variable that
begins three quarters after the new machine
was installed. Finally, u and v represent devia-
tions from the cost frontier due to facility-level
cost efficiency (u ≥ 0) and statistical noise (v).17
The translog cost function is a second-order
approximation to any function about a point of
expansion and has been used extensively in
recent years. Unfortunately, as one moves
away from the point of expansion, the approx-
imation becomes less precise.18
Because we derive our estimates of scale
economies and marginal costs from the rela-
tionship between outputs and cost, we must
be careful to specify the relationship with a
sufficient amount of flexibility to ensure that
the true underlying relationship between cost
and output can be revealed. To explore
whether the translog is flexible enough, we
also employ a “hybrid-translog” cost function.
This cost function includes the terms of the
translog model (equation [1]) together with
first-, second- and third-order trigonometric
terms of the Fourier functional form.19 More
formally, the hybrid-translog takes the form 
Currency in Circulation, New Notes Issued, and
Notes Destroyed, 1999 (millions of pieces)
TABLE 1
Dollar Notes in New notes Notes
denomination circulation issued
a destroyed
1 7,536 3,865 3,767
2 602 25 4
5 1,799 866 694
10 1,620 788 616
20 5,804 2,744 1,736
50 1,294 426 183
100 3,862 879 257
Total 22,516 9,593 7,257
a. Does not include additions to inventory at Reserve Banks.
SOURCE:  Annual Report, Budget Review, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (2000).
  17 Estimates of ui, the facility-specific cost-efficiency term, need
to be interpreted with care. These estimates are conditional on assump-
tions about the functional form for the cost function and its error terms.
  18 Generally, the expansion point used is the mean of the data.
  19 The hybrid-translog functional form has been used by Gallant
(1982) and Berger, Leusner, and Mingo (1997).
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where the zjit are the output quantities normal-
ized over the range (0, 2π). Equations (1) and
(2) are estimated along with corresponding
equations for input shares, with the usual
restrictions on symmetry and linear homogene-
ity imposed. 
Although the currency processing machines
themselves are quite intricate, the production
technology for currency processing, as revealed
by the cost function, may be relatively simple.
If this hypothesis is correct, then the translog
functional form should adequately characterize
currency processing. One risk associated with
using the hybrid-translog functional form is
that the data may be overfitted. That is, statis-
tical noise in the data may be absorbed into
the cost function. By estimating both functional
forms, we can obtain a deeper understanding
of the relationship between output and costs. 
We use two different econometric tech-
niques to measure facility-level cost efficiencies
for Federal Reserve currency processing and
handling operations because empirical mea-
surements of cost efficiency in the financial
services industry often vary significantly
depending on the methodology employed.20
By estimating the model two ways, we can
explore how sensitive our results are to differ-
ing assumptions. The generalized least squares
(GLS) estimation technique uses the longi-
tudinal aspect of the data and avoids assuming
a specific distribution for the inefficiency
term.21 Basically, this technique uses repeated
observations over time to identify firm-specific,
time-invariant inefficiencies, that is, uit=ui.
Iterative, seemingly unrelated regression tech-
niques are used to estimate the system of cost
and input share equations using longitudinal
data. The inefficiency terms are calculated by
using the average of the residuals for each
facilityi, ˆ  i. The most efficient currency han-
dling facility in the sample is assumed to be
fully efficient, and the inefficiency of every
other facility i is measured by the proportionate
increase in predicted costs above the predicted
cost of the most efficient facility, or ˆ  i – min
j
ˆ  j .
For GLS estimators to be consistent, the density
of the inefficiency disturbances must be
nonzero in the neighborhood of (0,ω) for
some ω> 0. In other words, as the number of
facilities in the sample increases, the probability
that a facility lies near the frontier approaches
one. Our efficiency measure is calculated using
the log difference in average residuals between
the facility on the cost frontier and the actual
average residual of facility i, or exp(– (ˆ  i –
min
j
ˆ  j).This measure is bounded between zero 
and one, with the most efficient facility having
an efficiency value equal to one.
The maximum likelihood technique (MLE)
identifies inefficiency primarily by the skew-
ness in residuals, rather than by persistence
over time.22 Statistical noise, v, is assumed to
be normally distributed, while inefficiency,u,
is assumed to be half-normally distributed. Our
MLE measure of inefficiency is calculated as
the conditional mean, E(u| u+v).23 Because the
MLE technique requires a priori assumptions
concerning the distribution of the inefficiency
terms while the GLS technique does not, we
tend to favor the GLS results. Both cost-
  20 See, for example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Bauer, Berger, 
and Humphrey (1993), and Berger (1993).
  21 See Schmidt and Sickels (1984).
  22 The maximum likelihood technique we employ is based on
Bauer, Ferrier, and Lovell (1987).
  23 This technique was developed by Jondrow, Lovell, Materov,
and Schmidt (1982).
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efficiency measures are presented below to
ascertain how robust our facility-level 
efficiency rankings are to alternative assump-
tions about the statistical properties of the
inefficiency terms. 
In practice, managers at each facility may
have little ability to vary the amount of equip-
ment and building inputs used over the short
run. Adding vault space, for example, would
require considerable modifications to a facility
because of the high security required for such
space. Also, high-speed currency processing
machines are relatively unique, and when they
were last purchased in 1990, enough were pur-
chased to meet anticipated demand through
2003. If an input, l, is, for all practical purposes,
fixed, then it is appropriate to use the input
quantity, qlit, rather than the input price, wlit,i n
the cost function. This substitution would be
appropriate regardless of the functional form
chosen for the cost function or the estimation
technique employed. Returns-to-scale measures,
of course, depend on whether inputs are fixed
or variable. When all inputs are variable, returns
to scale (RTS) can be measured using the cost
elasticity ( lδlnC/δlnql ). When K inputs are
fixed over the short run, the fixed-input version
of the RTS measure is: 
J
 [δ lnC(yit,wit , qkit)/δ lnyjit ]
j=1
(3)  RTS = K
1– [δlnC (yit,wit,qkit)/δ lnqkit ]
k=1
If the RTS measure is greater than one, then
costs increase more than proportionately with
output, which implies that the facility is operating
in a region where there are diseconomies of
scale. If, however, the RTS measure is less than
one, then the facility is operating in a region
where there are increasing returns to scale.
Only when the RTS measure equals one, is the
facility operating with constant returns to scale. 
III. Data
We collected quarterly data (1991 to 1996,
inclusive) on total costs, output volumes, input
prices, input quantities, and environmental
variables for 37 Federal Reserve currency
processing and handling facilities. We chose
this time period because it was a fairly tranquil
period for currency operations. Before 1991,
some Federal Reserve facilities used an assort-
ment of currency processing machines in
addition to the first generation of high-speed
processors, the CVCSs. After 1996, new note
designs were introduced—the $50 note in
October 1997 and the $20 note in September
1998.24 Also, as the century date change drew
near, the amount of currency outstanding
increased substantially.25 In all, the sample
included 886 observations.26
The primary data source is annual functional
cost accounting records from the Federal
Reserve’s Planning and Control System (PACS),
which are collected to monitor costs and
improve resource allocation within the System.
These data are supplemented by other cost data,
machine counts, and usage statistics; data from
occasional Federal Reserve surveys; and price
index information from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Total costs for each currency facility, Cit,
include the direct costs that arise from high-
speed currency processing; off-line currency
verification, destruction, and cancellation; and
currency paying and receiving operations.
Associated with these cost-generating activities
are three distinct and measurable outputs. We
include in the output vector, yit, the number of
fit notes generated by the high-speed currency
processing operations, yfit; the number of notes
destroyed either on-line by the high-speed
machines or off-line at the reconciliation
stations, ydit
27; and the total number of trans-
actions with depository institutions, that is,
the sum of the number of incoming shipments
of currency received at facility i and the
number of outgoing orders for currency filled
by facility i,ynit. 
Inputs used in currency operations are clas-
sified into buildings, B, labor, L, equipment, E,
and materials, M. Buildings’ share of total
currency costs averages only about 16 percent
  24 The new design for the $100 note was introduced in March
1996. Because the average life of a $100 note is about 8.5 years, however,
the number of $100 notes received by the Federal Reserve in 1996 (about
1 billion notes) was relatively small compared to the number of smaller-
denomination notes received (about 22.6 billion notes). Thus, the
introduction of the new design for the $100 note is unlikely to have
materially affected the Federal Reserve's currency operations in 1996.
  25 Total currency in circulation increased about 22 percent in
1999, although it had only grown about 7 percent per annum in the
previous four years.
  26 Although the Helena, Montana, facility operated during the two
quarters when the new BPS 3000 machines were installed, there are no
reported volumes for this period.
  27 Off-line destruction is undoubtedly more labor intensive and
consequently more expensive, but these items make up less than half of 
1 percent of notes destroyed.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 2001 Q49
because the interest expenses associated with
the acquisition of buildings are not included in
the cost-accounting framework. For the price
of building services, wB, we use an annual
square-foot replacement cost, adjusted by the
depreciation rate, for the location of each
building with currency operations.28 The quan-
tity of building services, qB, is proxied by the
actual number of square feet of space occu-
pied by currency operations at each facility. 
Over the 1991–96 period, approximately
52 percent of total costs for currency operations
are attributable to labor expenses. The price of
labor, wL, is constructed using data on expen-
ditures for labor, including salaries, retirement
and other benefits, and the number of
employee hours spent in currency operations. 
Equipment expenditures consist of depreci-
ation and maintenance expenses. For the price
of equipment, wE, we use the price index for
currency processing equipment reported in the
Producer Price Index Detailed Report. For the
quantities of equipment in operation at each
facility during each quarter, qCVCS and qBPS,we
use actual machine counts for CVCS and BPS
3000 machines, respectively.
Expenditures on materials, including cur-
rency straps and packaging, computer support,
printing and duplicating, and other centrally
provided support costs, account for about
11 percent of total costs. The price for material
inputs, wM, is constructed from material expen-
diture shares and various price indexes for
components of materials from the Survey of
Current Business29 and the Producer Price
Index Detailed Report, using a Tornquist
approximation to a Divisia index.30
Environmental variables are used to control
for the “quality” of incoming shipments and
the operating environment at each facility. To
measure the quality of incoming shipments we
use several proxies: the number of depositor
errors per 100,000 notes deposited; the propor-
tion of incoming notes that are $1 notes; the
proportion of notes that are rejected by high-
speed equipment; and the mean shipment size.
A higher value for any of these proxies is
expected to increase costs at the facility.
Depositor errors occur when a strap has more
or fewer than 100 notes of the same denomi-
nation. When such errors occur, the depositor’s
reserve account must be reconciled to reflect
the correct deposit balance.31 Small-denomina-
tion notes, such as $1 notes, have a relatively
short life compared to large-denomination
notes. For example, the average life of a
$1 note is 1.5 years, while the average life of a
$50 note is 5 years. Consequently, we can use
the proportion of incoming $1 notes in a
shipment to proxy for the shipment’s overall
quality. The proportion of notes rejected by
high-speed equipment would directly affect
the costs of currency handling and processing
because rejects are handled manually by an
operator on a low-speed machine. Also, a large
average shipment size may create a temporary
backlog for processing work.
The operating environment is controlled for
by variables that capture usage intensity of the
equipment. Usage intensity is proxied by the
proportion of scheduled operating time that
processing equipment is “down”; the propor-
tion of notes processed on BPS 3000 machines;
and the mean throughput of processing equip-
ment (measured in notes per hour). In addi-
tion, indicator variables are used to account for
temporary cost increases that resulted from an
unusual event that would affect only one Fed-
eral Reserve processing facility. One indicator
variable allows for higher costs during the
period when the New York office was testing
the new BPS 3000 machines (between
1992:IIIQ and 1994:IVQ). Because that office
was the first to use the BPS 3000 machines, it is
reasonable to assume that its transition costs
may have been higher than those who adopted
the machines later. Another indicator variable
is used to accommodate higher costs during
the period when the new Dallas branch was
constructed (1995:IQ through 1996:IVQ). 
IV. Empirical 
Results
The two forms of the cost function, the
translog and the hybrid-translog, are each
specified with different combinations of fixed
and variable inputs. In one specification, all
inputs are variable, in another, equipment
inputs are fixed, and in another, equipment
  28 For these purposes, data on replacement costs for buildings
are taken from the 17th edition of Means Square Foot Costs
(Means, 1996).
  29 See U.S. Department of Commerce (1990–97).
  30 The Tornquist index is constructed using the rates of growth
in the prices in each category. These rates of growth are weighted by the
average proportionate shares of materials expenses to each category
over adjoining periods. The base year is 1990.
  31 Note that the Reserve Banks absorb the differences on $1 note
deposits, so there are no depositor errors reported for $1 notes.
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and buildings are fixed. In all specifications,
labor and materials inputs are treated as vari-
able. Cost frontiers are estimated using the GLS
technique for both cost-function specifications
and the MLE technique for the tranlog cost-
function specification. These frontiers are
denoted as GLS/translog, GLS/hybrid-translog,
and MLE/translog.32
Returns to Scale
For every cost-function specification we 
estimate, the average-cost curve implied by the
cost frontier is U-shaped with a fairly flat portion
at the bottom of the U. The implied average
cost curve descends rapidly up to 100 million
notes per quarter and then is fairly flat for most
of the remaining observed output range.33
This shape is fairly typical for the average cost
curve of paper-based payment technologies.34
The minimum efficient scale (MES) for
currency depends on whether equipment and
buildings are treated as fixed inputs. For
example, using the GLS/translog model, the
MES is 260 million notes per quarter when all
inputs are variable, 680 million notes per
quarter when equipment is fixed, and 250 mil-
lion notes per quarter when equipment and
buildings are fixed.35 While this range for the
MES is quite large, the difference in average
costs for the largest and smallest MES output
levels is not economically meaningful because
the implied average cost function is so flat
through the region of 250 million notes per
quarter to 650 million notes per quarter. 
Table 2 presents average RTS measures for
Federal Reserve System currency and handling
operations using several cost-function speci-
fications and the two frontier-estimation tech-
niques. In this table, both the arithmetic mean
and a weighted mean of facility RTS measures
are presented in the top and bottom panels,
respectively. Weights each quarter vary across
Federal Reserve facilities and are equal to the
volume of notes processed at each facility.
Strikingly, neither the cost-function specifica-
tion nor the frontier-estimation technique
greatly affects the average RTS measures. The
measures are fairly robust to whether equip-
ment and buildings are considered fixed. And,
with one exception—the GLS/hybrid-translog
model specified with fixed buildings and
equipment—such measures are fairly robust to
whether a translog or hybrid-translog func-
tional form is used. Regardless of the cost-
function specification or frontier-estimation
technique chosen, the mean of the unweighted
RTS is smaller than the mean of the weighted
RTS measure. This happens because, even
though there are substantial unexploited poten-
tial scale economies at many facilities in the
System, the vast majority of notes are processed
and handled at the facilities that have already
achieved constant returns to scale.
Focusing on the first and last quarters of the
estimation period, 1991:IQ and 1996:IVQ,
respectively, we calculate facility-specific
returns-to-scale measures. Table 3 presents
these returns-to-scale measures for each office
that is estimated using the GLS/translog model
with all inputs specified as variable. The
Average Returns to Scale for 
Federal Reserve Currency Operations
TABLE 2
Functional form/estimation technique
Cost-function specification GLS/translog GLS/hybrid-translog MLE/translog
Arithmetic mean
All inputs variable 0.79 0.78 0.77
Equipment fixed 0.81 0.76 0.80
Equipment and 
buildings fixed 0.83 0.78 0.81
Weighted mean
All inputs variable 0.93 0.91 0.91
Equipment fixed 0.97 0.86 0.93
Equipment and 
buildings fixed 0.98 0.78 0.94
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations. Weighted means use the number of notes
processed as the weighting measure.
  32 We did not estimate an MLE/hybrid-translog model because
the computation time required to achieve convergence would have been
unacceptably long on account of the large number of additional 
parameters required for this model.
  33 Most facilities with output less than 100 million notes per
quarter have only one high-speed currency processing machine.
  34 Zimmerman (1981) and Dotsey (1991) report cost-function
estimates for Federal Reserve currency operations that are consistent
with a U-shaped average cost curve. Humphrey (1981), Bauer and
Hancock (1993), and Bauer and Ferrier (1996) also report cost-function
estimates for Federal Reserve check processing operations that are
consistent with a U-shaped average cost curve.
  35 MES estimates from the GLS/translog model are represen-
tative of MES estimates from the GLS/hybrid-translog and MLE/
translog models.
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returns to scale. At the end of the sample, 28
facilities have statistically significant increasing
returns to scale and 10 exhibit constant returns
to scale. Although the number of notes received
by the Federal Reserve System increased by
about 20 percent over this period (figure 1),
Returns-to-Scale Measures for Federal Reserve 
Currency Processing and Handling Facilities
TABLE 3
Federal Reserve office 1991:IQ estimate 1991:IQ t-test 1996:IVQ estimate 1996:IVQ t-test
FR 1 0.800 3.199 0.837 2.652
FR 2 0.933 1.109 0.937 1.046
FR 3 0.691 4.337 0.826 2.801
FR 4 1.006 –0.080 1.030 0.366
FR 5 0.843 1.760 0.594 4.031
FR 6 1.066 0.822 1.052 0.723
FR 7 0.990 0.133 1.122 1.529
FR 8 0.765 4.087 0.821 3.189
FR 9 0.793 3.105 0.874 2.135
FR 10 0.761 3.777 0.804 3.425
FR 11 0.712 4.621 0.810 3.346
FR 12 0.838 2.804 0.815 2.304
FR 13 0.497 6.692 0.619 5.579
FR 14 0.404 6.648 0.493 6.417
FR 15 0.621 5.255 0.795 3.649
FR 16 0.735 3.351 0.687 3.324
FR 17 0.613 5.903 0.680 5.252
FR 18 0.484 6.708 0.689 5.021
FR 19 1.208 2.404 1.141 1.502
FR 20 0.641 5.240 0.701 4.860
FR 21 0.687 4.866 0.734 4.313
FR 22 0.744 2.621 0.676 2.534
FR 23 0.778 2.953 0.787 2.575
FR 24 0.724 4.671 0.715 4.923
FR 25 0.779 3.863 0.815 2.817
FR 26 1.038 0.393 1.042 0.347
FR 27 0.657 5.399 0.690 4.859
FR 28 0.460 6.682 0.583 5.596
FR 29 0.916 1.145 0.946 0.796
FR 30 0.831 2.997 0.787 3.595
FR 31 0.572 5.441 0.554 6.461
FR 32 0.973 0.359 0.922 1.286
FR 33 0.572 6.323 0.509 6.572
FR 34 0.650 5.361 0.759 3.658
FR 35 1.062 0.848 1.013 0.166
FR 36 0.592 5.504 0.707 3.829
FR 37 0.648 5.152 0.754 4.349
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations. The t-test statistic is for a “two-tail” test of the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is equal to 1.
t-statistics in the table test the hypothesis that
the RTS estimate differs from one. At the
beginning of the sample, 27 facilities have
statistically significant increasing returns to
scale, 9 facilities exhibit constant returns to
scale, and 1 facility has significant decreasing
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the introduction of higher-speed processing
machines enabled each facility to achieve simi-
lar returns to scale as before their introduction.
Facilities with insufficient processing volume to
achieve scale efficiency in 1991 continued to
have insufficient processing volume to achieve
scale efficiency in 1996. It remains the case,
however, that scale efficiency for Federal
Reserve currency operations improved on
average because no facility operated with
statistically significant decreasing returns to
scale, and far fewer facilities operated with an
RTS measure less than 0.70 by the end of the
estimation period. 
Our RTS findings suggest that there was
considerable excess capacity in Federal Reserve
currency operations. This excess capacity has
been used to accommodate the public’s
growing demand for currency, which increases
demand for currency processing, including the
destruction of unfit currency. However, to the
extent that use of the new Sacagawea dollar
coins substitute for $1 notes, more Federal
Reserve facilities may be operating with
increasing returns to scale in the future unless
some smaller facilities are consolidated. Of
course, the higher unit costs of operating with
increasing returns to scale must be weighed
against the costs of being unable to meet
demand shocks for currency processing and
handling. Also, the cost savings of consolidating
facilities would have to be balanced against the
higher costs of transporting currency deposits
and withdrawals over longer distances.36
Alternatively, the overall level of scale efficiency
FIGURE 1
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SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
  36 Bauer et al. (2000) considered whether Federal Reserve
System currency processing costs could be lowered by reallocating
currency volume across facilities or by consolidating facilities. They
found most cost savings could be achieved without closing any existing
currency processing facilities. In addition, they argued that a new facility
located in Phoenix, Arizona, would help to lower System currency
processing costs.
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achieved by Federal Reserve currency opera-
tions could potentially be improved over time
by adjusting standards for normal service levels
or by changing fees for nonstandard access or
nonstandard cash services.37
Marginal Costs
Recently, some observers have argued that the
Federal Reserve should explicitly charge for
currency services because outgoing currency
from the Reserve Banks is of higher quality
than the incoming currency from depository
institutions.38 Such observers typically argue
that some currency users would be willing to
pay for a higher-quality, “superfit” currency
because they manage newer technologies that
would perform better with higher-quality
currency (such as ATMs or vending machines).
With the view to improve economic effi-
ciency, potential prices for currency services
would likely depend on the marginal costs of
production for fit currency, for destroying
currency, and for currency shipments. We
estimate such marginal costs at each facility by
using cost frontiers that assume all inputs are
variable in the short run. In table 4, both the
arithmetic mean and a weighted mean of
Federal Reserve facility-level marginal cost
estimates for fit currency, destroyed currency,
and cash shipments are presented. 
As with the weighted RTS measures pre-
sented in table 2, the weights used in table 4
each quarter vary across Federal Reserve
facilities and are equal to the volume of notes
processed at each facility. The average Federal
Reserve System marginal cost for fit currency,
destroyed currency, and cash shipments is
higher when each facility’s marginal cost is
weighted by its output volume. This happens
because the marginal cost is less than the
average cost when a facility operates with
increasing returns to scale, as did most facili-
ties. The average marginal costs for fit and
destroyed currency, unweighted or weighted,
are higher when the MLE technique is used
Marginal Costs of Production for Fit Currency,






(Cents per note) 0.358 0.344 0.398
Destroyed currency
(Cents per note) 0.161 0.145 0.175
Cash shipments
(Dollars per shipment) 22.63 30.43 14.09
Weighted mean
Fit currency
(Cents per note) 0.428 0.369 0.521
Destroyed currency
(Cents per note) 0.234 0.200 0.235
Cash shipments
(Dollars per shipment) 38.82 58.15 21.11
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. Weighted means use the number of notes
processed as the weighting measure.
The Effects of Environmental Variables 
on the Cost of Currency Operations
TABLE 5
Environmental  variable Sample mean Estimate
Quality of incoming shipments
The number of depositor errors per 
$100,000 notes deposited 13.152 0.0317**
The proportion of incoming notes that
were of $1 denomination 0.370 –0.024
The proportion of notes rejected by high-
speed equipment 0.022 0.156***
The mean shipment size (in notes) 70,757 0.345***
Usage intensity of equipment
The proportion of scheduled operating time
that processing equipment was “down” 0.041 0.083***
The proportion of notes processed on
BPS 3000 machines 0.223 0.068***
The mean throughput of processing 
equipment (in notes per hour) 66,030 0.234*
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. Estimates significantly different from zero at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance level are indicated with *, **, and ***,
respectively. All significance tests used a two-tailed t-test.
  37 Although the uniform cash access policy established normal
access for a depository institution as once per week, Reserve Banks can
charge for more frequent nonstandard access. In addition, Reserve Banks
can and do charge for services such as nonstandard packages and non-
standard packaging of same-day express cash orders.
  38 See Supel and Todd (1984) and Lacker (1993).
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than when the GLS technique is used, but of
similar magnitude. 
The average Federal Reserve marginal cost
for fit currency is typically less than one-half of
a cent per note during the period studied. The
average marginal cost for destroyed currency is
about half that. Marginal cost estimates for cash
shipments, which are reported at the bottom
lines of the top and bottom panels of table 4,
are very sensitive to both the functional form
of the cost function and the econometric
technique used to estimate the cost frontier:
Depending on which forms and techniques are
used, the arithmetic mean marginal cost for
Federal Reserve cash shipments ranges from
$14 to $30, and the weighted mean ranges
from $21 to $58. 
Environmental 
Factors
In every specification for the cost frontier we
estimated, environmental factors are important
cost determinants. Table 5 presents the effects
of environmental variables on the cost of
production when the cost frontier estimated is
the GLS/translog and all inputs are considered
variable.39
The quality of incoming currency deposits
significantly influences Federal Reserve costs.
The number of depositor errors per 100,000
notes deposited, the proportion of notes that
are rejected by high-speed equipment, and the
mean shipment size each significantly raises
Federal Reserve currency handling and
processing costs at the 5 percent level of signi-
ficance. A 1 percent increase in the number of
depositor errors increases costs by 0.03
percent, a 1 percent increase in the propor-
tion of notes rejected by high-speed equip-
ment increases costs by 0.16 percent, and
a 1 percent increase in mean shipment size
increases costs by 0.35 percent. Only the
proportion of incoming notes that are of
$1 denomination is not significant among the
variables that measure incoming currency quality.
FIGURE 2
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 3
Year-Indicator Effects for Various 
Model Specifications
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  39 The environmental effects we present in table 5 are represen-
tative of the others we derive using alternative cost frontiers.
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Operating environment variables also affect
the cost of providing currency services. The
proportion of scheduled operating time that
processing equipment is down and the propor-
tion of notes processed on BPS 3000 machines
each significantly raises costs at the 1 percent
level of significance. In addition, the mean-
throughput-of-processing-equipment variable
is significant at the 10 percent level. 
Time Adjustment 
Factors
The last environmental coefficients we
consider are the variables included to control
for technical change in general and the intro-
duction of the new machines in particular.
The estimated coefficients for these variables
are fairly consistent across the various specifi-
cations. Figure 2 plots the effects of the year-
indicator variable for the GLS/translog,
GLS/hybrid-translog, and MLE/translog models.
Figure 3 plots the GLS/translog model with all
inputs variable, with equipment fixed, and
with equipment and building inputs fixed.
Although it appears that the cost function has
shifted up 10 to 15 percent from 1991 to 1996,
it should be noted that because we include
variables that control for the transition to new
machines, it is not possible to interpret these
coefficients as a technical change index, as is
often done. The reason is that the full effect of
technical change must include the effects of
these other variables.
Recall that we include an indicator variable
for the first quarter during which a processing
site employed the new machines, another
indicator variable for the second quarter of
use, and a time trend to capture the effects in
later quarters. The combined effect of these
three variables, which we call the learning-by-
doing effect, is plotted in figure 4 for the GLS/
translog, GLS/hybrid-translog, and MLE/
translog models. As one might suspect, new
machines disrupt the previous work environ-
ment, and all the models report higher costs
in the quarter in which the new machines are
introduced. The models do differ as to what
happens after that. Our preferred estimation
technique, GLS, estimates that, after spiking
sharply in the quarter when the new machines
are introduced, costs fairly rapidly decline.
After just two years, the learning-by-doing
effect of the new machines would be more
than enough to offset the year-indicator vari-
ables. When the model is estimated using MLE,
FIGURE 4




























GLS/translog, with fixed equipment




Economic Review 2001 Q416
the learning-by-doing effect is much smaller,
and consequently, the decline in costs is much
slower. As figure 5 reveals, the GLS estimates
of the learning-by-doing effect demonstrate the
same pattern whether capital or buildings are
treated as variable or fixed inputs.
Cost Efficiency 
The estimates for cost efficiency using the
alternative functional forms, estimation tech-
niques, and specifications are presented in
table 6. The GLS/translog model yields the
lowest average cost-efficiency estimates for
Federal Reserve System currency operations.
Depending on whether equipment and build-
ing inputs are fixed, the arithmetic average of
facility-level cost-efficiency estimates ranges
between 0.81 and 0.84, and the minimum cost-
efficiency estimates range between 0.60 and
0.72. These statistics suggest that during the
period studied, the average facility operated at
more than 80 percent of the efficiency of the
“best-practice” facility, and the worst performer
in the system could have substantially improved
its efficiency.
Estimates of average cost-efficiency levels
are higher when a hybrid-translog functional
form is used for the cost function. This is not
surprising because the hybrid-translog attrib-
utes a larger proportion of the variance in cost
to the structural component of the model. This
attribution results in higher average cost-
efficiency estimates. In addition, estimates of
average cost-efficiency levels are higher when the
MLE technique is used to estimate the frontier. 
The weighted means of the cost-efficiency
estimates are lower than the corresponding
arithmetic means. The weighted means are
lower because larger facilities in the System
typically have lower cost-efficiency estimates
than do smaller facilities.40
In general, cost-function specifications with
fixed inputs yield higher average levels of cost
efficiency, regardless of the functional form for
the cost function or the technique used to
estimate the cost frontier. This consistency
across the top, middle, and bottom panels of
table 6 suggests that managers view equipment
and building inputs as largely fixed. Because
changes to such inputs require substantial lead
times, this view seems quite plausible.
If facility-specific efficiency measures are
to be useful for managerial or policymaking
purposes, they should rank facilities consis-
tently and be robust to different specifications
of the cost function or to different econometric
techniques. In tables 7, 8, and 9, we present
facility-specific cost-efficiency estimates for all
of our models. Table 7 reports estimates when
all inputs are variable, table 8 when equipment
inputs are fixed, and table 9 when equipment
and buildings are fixed inputs. Each table
shows the results of all combinations of the
functional form of the cost function and the
two estimation techniques we consider. In
addition, for each model, cost-efficiency
estimates are ranked from most efficient (cost-
efficiency estimate equals one) to least efficient
  40 Currency processing and handling facilities with the largest
output levels tend to be Reserve Bank head offices. Such facilities have
additional administrative staff for the District. Even after incorporating a
head office indicator variable into the cost-function models, facilities with
the largest output volume tend to have lower levels of cost efficiency than
smaller facilities.
Facility-Level Efficiency Estimate Statistics for
Federal Reserve Currency Operations
TABLE 6
Functional form/estimation technique
Type of specification GLS/translog GLS/hybrid-translog MLE/translog
All inputs variable
Arithmetic mean 0.815 0.844 0.893
Weighted mean 0.810 0.838 0.888
Minimum 0.596 0.633 0.770
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.952
Median 0.822 0.848 0.897
Equipment inputs fixed
Arithmetic mean 0.825 0.863 0.902
Weighted mean 0.819 0.850 0.896
Minimum 0.623 0.662 0.800
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.946
Median 0.834 0.861 0.903
Equipment and building
inputs fixed
Arithmetic mean 0.844 0.861 0.917
Weighted mean 0.836 0.866 0.911
Minimum 0.716 0.722 0.871
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.958
Median 0.839 0.855 0.918
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. The weighted mean level of cost efficiency
weights each facility-level cost-efficiency estimate by the mean number
of notes processed per quarter at that facility during the 1991:IQ to
1996:IVQ period.
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Reserve facility efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank
FR 1 1.000 1 0.989 3 0.943 2
FR 2 0.991 2 1.000 1 0.941 3
FR 3 0.982 3 0.992 2 0.952 1
FR 4 0.958 4 0.971 4 0.931 4
FR 5 0.900 5 0.967 5 0.916 8
FR 6 0.872 6 0.910 6 0.899 15
FR 7 0.871 7 0.863 13 0.898 17
FR 8 0.871 8 0.849 17 0.926 5
FR 9 0.868 9 0.900 8 0.924 6
FR 10 0.859 10 0.890 9 0.920 7
FR 11 0.859 11 0.874 11 0.896 21
FR 12 0.855 12 0.848 18 0.916 9
FR 13 0.854 13 0.849 16 0.893 24
FR 14 0.854 14 0.874 10 0.912 10
FR 15 0.845 15 0.901 7 0.899 16
FR 16 0.837 16 0.854 14 0.882 26
FR 17 0.833 17 0.838 20 0.895 22
FR 18 0.831 18 0.821 24 0.893 23
FR 19 0.822 19 0.874 12 0.910 11
FR 20 0.810 20 0.853 15 0.896 20
FR 21 0.809 21 0.826 23 0.881 28
FR 22 0.808 22 0.848 19 0.900 14
FR 23 0.799 23 0.821 25 0.879 29
FR 24 0.786 24 0.817 26 0.897 19
FR 25 0.770 25 0.827 22 0.901 13
FR 26 0.764 26 0.802 29 0.891 25
FR 27 0.760 27 0.808 27 0.872 30
FR 28 0.756 28 0.801 30 0.882 27
FR 29 0.744 29 0.835 21 0.897 18
FR 30 0.728 30 0.804 28 0.906 12
FR 31 0.726 31 0.780 32 0.867 31
FR 32 0.722 32 0.712 36 0.839 35
FR 33 0.714 33 0.726 34 0.866 32
FR 34 0.706 34 0.759 33 0.838 36
FR 35 0.706 35 0.784 31 0.865 33
FR 36 0.693 36 0.723 35 0.852 34
FR 37 0.596 37 0.633 37 0.770 37
17
Cost-Efficiency Estimates and Relative 
Rankings, Cost Model with All Inputs Variable
TABLE 7
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations. Facility with rank 1 in each column is the “best-practice” facility using the specification/econometric tech-
nique specified. Cost-efficiency estimates are for the full period from 1991:IQ to 1996:IVQ.
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Cost-Efficiency Estimates and Relative 
Rankings, Cost Model with Equipment Fixed
TABLE 8
Federal GLS/translog cost- GLS/hybrid-translog MLE/translog
Reserve facility efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank
FR 1 0.921 4 0.957 5 0.931 4
FR 2 0.974 2 0.975 3 0.941 3
FR 3 0.943 3 0.969 4 0.946 1
FR 4 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.943 2
FR 5 0.911 5 0.983 2 0.927 5
FR 6 0.890 6 0.918 7 0.917 13
FR 7 0.862 12 0.891 11 0.908 17
FR 8 0.863 11 0.861 19 0.925 7
FR 9 0.861 14 0.918 6 0.924 8
FR 10 0.867 9 0.904 9 0.920 11
FR 11 0.865 10 0.882 13 0.902 21
FR 12 0.840 18 0.868 16 0.918 12
FR 13 0.815 21 0.851 23 0.883 31
FR 14 0.862 13 0.876 14 0.915 15
FR 15 0.846 16 0.905 8 0.908 16
FR 16 0.875 7 0.868 17 0.899 23
FR 17 0.809 24 0.856 22 0.903 20
FR 18 0.814 22 0.829 28 0.899 24
FR 19 0.844 17 0.885 12 0.916 14
FR 20 0.809 25 0.867 18 0.899 22
FR 21 0.828 20 0.858 21 0.894 28
FR 22 0.856 15 0.897 10 0.921 10
FR 23 0.812 23 0.807 31 0.896 26
FR 24 0.834 19 0.861 20 0.923 9
FR 25 0.788 26 0.842 25 0.894 27
FR 26 0.783 27 0.833 27 0.897 25
FR 27 0.732 33 0.801 32 0.864 33
FR 28 0.755 29 0.823 29 0.892 29
FR 29 0.781 28 0.851 24 0.903 19
FR 30 0.870 8 0.875 15 0.925 6
FR 31 0.750 31 0.810 30 0.891 30
FR 32 0.725 34 0.744 36 0.853 36
FR 33 0.712 35 0.769 35 0.874 32
FR 34 0.709 36 0.788 33 0.862 34
FR 35 0.754 30 0.842 26 0.905 18
FR 36 0.734 32 0.786 34 0.861 35
FR 37 0.623 37 0.662 37 0.800 37
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations. Facility with rank 1 in each column is the “best practice” facility using the specification/econometric 
technique specified. Cost-efficiency estimates are for the full period from 1991:IQ to 1996:IVQ.
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Cost-Efficiency Estimates and Relative Rankings,
Cost Model with Fixed Equipment and Buildings
TABLE 9
Federal GLS/translog cost- GLS/hybrid-translog MLE/translog
Reserve facility efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank cost-efficiency estimate Rank
FR 1 0.963 4 0.961 3 0.943 4
FR 2 0.982 3 0.958 4 0.958 1
FR 3 0.994 2 0.977 2 0.944 3
FR 4 1.000 1 1.000 1 0.946 2
FR 5 0.858 14 0.911 6 0.931 11
FR 6 0.875 11 0.902 7 0.932 9
FR 7 0.844 17 0.854 20 0.919 17
FR 8 0.897 8 0.878 12 0.931 10
FR 9 0.844 18 0.864 16 0.927 14
FR 10 0.847 16 0.864 17 0.925 15
FR 11 0.823 21 0.845 25 0.919 18
FR 12 0.890 9 0.886 11 0.930 12
FR 13 0.817 24 0.845 26 0.905 29
FR 14 0.820 23 0.849 23 0.918 19
FR 15 0.801 28 0.831 27 0.918 21
FR 16 0.927 5 0.891 8 0.933 6
FR 17 0.863 12 0.861 18 0.918 20
FR 18 0.902 7 0.890 9 0.938 5
FR 19 0.837 20 0.853 21 0.914 23
FR 20 0.807 26 0.825 28 0.913 24
FR 21 0.800 29 0.814 32 0.910 28
FR 22 0.909 6 0.922 5 0.927 13
FR 23 0.803 27 0.803 34 0.902 31
FR 24 0.851 15 0.849 22 0.932 7
FR 25 0.839 19 0.875 13 0.910 27
FR 26 0.821 22 0.855 19 0.911 26
FR 27 0.796 31 0.846 24 0.896 32
FR 28 0.747 35 0.807 33 0.886 33
FR 29 0.811 25 0.874 15 0.912 25
FR 30 0.881 10 0.874 14 0.932 8
FR 31 0.753 33 0.819 29 0.903 30
FR 32 0.716 37 0.722 37 0.877 36
FR 33 0.796 30 0.816 30 0.916 22
FR 34 0.766 32 0.815 31 0.884 34
FR 35 0.860 13 0.888 10 0.924 16
FR 36 0.744 36 0.770 35 0.871 37
FR 37 0.747 34 0.760 36 0.882 35
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations. Facility with rank 1 in each column is the “best practice” facility using the specification/econometric 
technique specified. Cost-efficiency estimates are for the full period from 1991:IQ to 1996:IVQ.
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(cost-efficiency equals the minimum cost-
efficiency estimate). Facilities are identified
using their cost-efficiency estimate rank for the
GLS/translog model that considered all inputs
variable (table 7, second column). 
Although the relative ranks of cost-efficiency
estimates for individual facilities vary consider-
ably across our different models, a number of
facilities are consistently ranked among the
most and least efficient in the Federal Reserve
System. Facilities denoted by FR1 through FR4
are consistently ranked among the five most
efficient facilities. FR1 through FR6 are consis-
tently among the top 10 efficient facilities. Con-
sistently ranked among the least efficient facili-
ties are facilities denoted by FR32, FR34, FR36,
and FR37. Interestingly, both the most efficient
and least efficient groups contain head offices
and branches. Rankings in the middle range of
efficiency rankings are more volatile because,
for facilities in that range, a small change in
efficiency leads to a large change in ranking,
and efficiency estimates for facilities in the
middle range are very close. The consistency
of the relative rankings of the most and least
efficient offices and the considerable dis-
agreement about the rankings of facilities in
the middle of the range of rankings is illustrated
in figures 6 through 8. 
We calculate Spearman and Kendall Tau-b
rank-order correlations for the series reported in 
tables 7, 8 and 9, to determine the association be-
tween cost-efficiency estimates. The Spearman 
rank-order correlation measure is concerned with
differences in absolute rankings, putting the
highest weight on facilities at the extremes,
whereas the Kendall Tau-b rank-order correla-
tion measure captures the differences in
relative rankings. These rank-order correlations
are presented in tables 10 and 11 along with
rank-order correlations between cost-effi-
ciency estimates and two accounting-based
performance measures—the number of notes
processed on high-speed equipment per
man-hour (a labor productivity measure) and
the number of notes processed per dollar of
cost (a unit cost measure). These accounting-
based measures of performance do not take
into account differences in environmental
variables, nor do they account for the effect of
differences in the scale of operations between
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The Spearman correlation coefficients
presented in table 10 are generally greater than
0.70, and each is statistically significant at the
5 percent level. Overall, such correlation
coefficients are larger when the models’
assumptions are more similar or when the
same econometric technique is used to estimate
the cost frontier. Not surprisingly, the weakest
relationships are between cost-frontier-based
and accounting-based measures of facility-level
efficiency. 
The Kendall Tau-b correlation coefficients
presented in table 11 are smaller than the cor-
responding Spearman correlation coefficients
presented in table 10. This implies that the
efficiency rankings do not perform as well for
facilities in the middle cost-efficiency range. 
As with the Spearman correlation coefficients,
every Kendall Tau-b correlation coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level,
which suggests an extremely high degree of
concordance between our cost-efficiency
measures. Again, consistency is greatest
between cost-efficiency measures when the
models’ assumptions are most similar or where
the same econometric technique is used to
estimate the cost frontier. Consistency is weakest
between cost-frontier-based and accounting-
based measures of facility-level efficiency.
Indeed, the Kendall correlation coefficients
between cost-frontier-based and accounting-
based measures of facility-level efficiency are
all less than 0.50. This suggests that econo-
metric measures of site-level efficiency may
provide useful insights for the identification
of “best-practice” currency processing and
handling facilities within the Federal Reserve
System, which accounting measures of per-
formance may overlook.
Some Federal Reserve districts may focus on
cost efficiency to a greater degree than others.
Because five of the six consistently most effi-
cient facilities are located in just two of the
twelve Federal Reserve districts, we test for
differences in the estimates of the mean level
of cost efficiency of facilities in those two
Federal Reserve districts against the remaining
ten districts. We find that the average efficiency
of the facilities in the two districts exceeds that
of the remainder of the Federal Reserve System
at the 1 percent significance level using a one-
sided t-test. 
We were curious to see whether cost-
efficiency estimates show any pattern across
services. To do so, we compare our baseline
estimates of currency cost efficiency with those
for check as reported by Bauer and Ferrier
(1996). The Spearman correlation coefficient is
0.309 and is statistically significant only at the
10 percent confidence level. The Kendall
Tau-b correlation coefficient is lower, 0.232,
but is statistically significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. These results suggest that
senior officers who oversee currency operations
well also tend to oversee check operations
well. These correlations also suggest that high
cost efficiency in one area is not achieved by
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Spearman Correlation Coefficients between
Site-Level Measures of Efficiency
TABLE 1 0
Cost-frontier-based cost-efficiency measures Accounting-based
All inputs variable Equipment fixed Equipment and buildings fixed performance measures
GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ Labor Unit Cost
translog hybrid- translog translog hybrid- translog translog hybrid- translog Produc-
translog translog translog tivity
GLS/translog 1.0 0.938 0.825 0.881 0.865 0.743 0.690 0.645 0.712 0.598 0.639
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.848 0.881 0.934 0.772 0.649 0.653 0.684 0.612 0.667
MLE/translog 1.0 0.845 0.881 0.910 0.737 0.743 0.750 0.630 0.645
GLS/translog 1.0 0.925 0.864 0.794 0.730 0.836 0.578 0.554
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.892 0.717 0.716 0.766 0.574 0.598
MLE/translog 1.0 0.825 0.798 0.867 0.595 0.564
GLS/translog 1.0 0.936 0.936 0.575 0.463
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.871 0.561 0.483
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Kendall Tau-b Correlation Coefficients between
Site-Level Measures of Efficiency
TABLE 1 1
Cost-frontier-based cost-efficiency measures Accounting-based
All inputs variable Equipment fixed Equipment and buildings fixed performance measures
GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ GLS/ GLS/ MLE/ Labor Unit Cost
translog hybrid- translog translog hybrid- translog translog hybrid- translog Produc-
translog translog translog tivity
GLS/translog 1.0 0.804 0.670 0.742 0.691 0.592 0.526 0.496 0.565 0.411 0.456
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.697 0.727 0.802 0.625 0.486 0.480 0.544 0.426 0.471
MLE/translog 1.0 0.670 0.703 0.778 0.562 0.574 0.571 0.465 0.486
GLS/translog 1.0 0.781 0.689 0.616 0.568 0.661 0.429 0.414
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.727 0.541 0.534 0.598 0.396 0.423
MLE/translog 1.0 0.664 0.662 0.715 0.429 0.429
GLS/translog 1.0 0.790 0.787 0.399 0.324
GLS/hybrid-
translog
1.0 0.697 0.399 0.354
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V. Conclusion
It costs more than half a billion dollars each
year to meet the demands for currency by
depository institutions, businesses, and con-
sumers.41 Yet very little research has been
devoted to understanding the factors that affect
such costs. This paper has attempted to fill a
portion of this gap by considering the scale
and cost efficiency of Federal Reserve currency
operations.
Our finding that there are limited scale
economies for Federal Reserve currency opera-
tions suggests that currency services are not a
natural monopoly. As with other paper-based
payments technologies, the average cost curve
implied by the cost frontier for currency
operations is U-shaped with a fairly wide, flat
portion at the bottom of the U. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve System processes the vast
majority of notes at facilities that have near-
constant returns to scale. By the end of
1996, 10 Federal Reserve facilities were already
operating at constant returns to scale, and the
volume of notes processed (figure 1) has con-
tinued to increase since that time. Going for-
ward, information on facility-specific marginal
costs and returns-to-scale measures could
potentially be used to improve resource allo-
cations. For example, such information could
be used to set fees for some currency services
or to tailor cash service standards that define
normal service levels to each depository insti-
tution. From a policymaking perspective, the
technology for currency handling and process-
ing does not appear to have the declining unit
costs that would give rise to a market failure
that is sufficient to justify or to sustain a
monopoly currency provider. Of course, there
may be other reasons for preserving the cur-
rent arrangement given the Federal Reserve’s
critical role in supplying and maintaining the
integrity of currency in the United States.
Our finding that the average facility operates
at more than 80 percent of the efficiency of
the “best-practice” facility is comparable to
cost-efficiency estimates reported elsewhere
for private-sector financial institutions.42 Just
like its for-profit services,43 the Federal Reserve
could potentially reduce costs by having
the worst-performing facilities adopt the
procedures and operations of the best-
performing facilities.
Our finding of significant concordance
between cost-efficiency estimates for currency
processing and handling services, which are
not required by the MCA to recover economic
costs in the marketplace, and check processing
services, which are, suggests that the Federal
Reserve may have realized some of the bene-
fits that a more competitive currency market
might have delivered. By encouraging the
formation of a competitive market for check
services, the MCA also gave Reserve Banks a
greater incentive to control costs and improve
resource allocation. Thus, the MCA appears to
have generated spillover benefits by creating a
management culture that increased operational
efficiency even for currency services in which
the Federal Reserve maintained its monopoly.
This spillover benefit from the Federal Reserve’s
participation in competitive payments markets
to services of a more purely governmental
nature has previously been ignored in studies
that have examined the Federal Reserve’s role
in the payments system.44
  41 In 2000, for example, the Federal Reserve spent about
$133 million on high-speed currency operations; $4.6 million on currency
cancellation, verification, and destruction; $65 million on paying and
receiving activities; and $456 million for printing of new Federal Reserve
notes, shipment of new notes by the Bureau of Printing and Engraving
(BPE), intra-System shipments of fit notes, counterfeit deterrence research,
the return of currency pallets to the BPE, and reimbursement to the U.S.
Treasury Office of Currency Standards. Federal Reserve outlays do not
include the costs of currency operations borne by depository institutions.
  42 See, for example, Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (1993) and
Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey (1993).
  43 See Bauer and Hancock (1993) and Bauer and Ferrier (1996).
  44 See, for example, Green and Todd (2001).
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